| 
 Alois RiklinVeracity in PoliticsFarewell Lecture
 
		
	
	The Lies walking like cripples on the crutches
	 
	Farmer (cap)Soldier (helmet) - Citizen (fur cap)
 Aristocrat (crown) - Clergyman (miter)
 
	The Beggars - Pieter Bruegel the ElderMusée du Louvre, Paris
 
 
	
	About the author - 
	Alois Riklin,
	born 1935, Dr.iur., 1970-2001 professor for political science at the University of St. Gallen, founder and
	director of the institute for political science, 1982-1986 rector of the St. Gallen University.
	 
	(c) Alois Riklin, St. Gallen, 2001
	 
	special edition by Stämpfli Verlag, Bern
	 
	 (a)web/pdf re-edition courtesy of the author (a)
	for Czech and Slovaks building up democracy
 
   
	(a)
	web :
	vjrott.com/veracity-in-politics
	/ pdf download :
	vjrott.com/veracity-in-politics.pdf
	
	
 
 
	Table of contentsVeracity in Politics
	
	1  Positions in moral philosophy 1.1  The absolute prohibition of
		lying1.2  The permissibility of lying
 1.3  The partial permissibility of lying
 2  A typology of practical cases 
	2.1  Legitimate untruthfulness
	
	Untruthfulness out of courtesy or consideration
	Suppression, discretion, and secrecy
 Ambiguity and secret reservation
 White lie to save life and limb
 Stratagems
 
	2.2  Illegitimate untruthfulness
	 
	Qualified mental reservation
	Unlawful word of honour
 Electioneering fraud
 Disinformation of parliament and the people
 Rigged elections
 Broken promise
 Politician's official lie
 Perjury before a parliamentary investigation committee
 3  Incentives for truthfulness 
	3.1  Person-oriented political ethics
	3.2  Institution-oriented political ethics
 3.3  Results-oriented political ethics
 Conclusion Bibliography
 
 
	
	Veracity in PoliticsTruthfulness in politics: is there such a thing? Is this
	not a contradiction in terms? Isn't politics a dirty
	business? Politics has to do with power, and is not power as
	such evil, as Jacob Burckhardt thought? (1)
	Didn't Niccolò Machiavelli recommend that whoever
	wants to remain a good Christian, indeed a good human being,
	should keep his distance from politics? (2)
	Didn't Hannah Arendt write in her book Wahrheit und
	Lüge in der Politik [Truth and Lying in
	Politics]: "Truthfulness has never numbered among the
	political virtues, and lying has always been permitted as a
	political instrument"? (3)
	Didn't Niklas Luhmann argue that political systems are not
	meant to be checked on the basis of ethical criteria? (4)
	Didn't he say that whoever entered the level of politics
	would ineluctably face the dilemma of moral
	naïveté or moral cynicism. (5)
	Luhmann decided in favour of cynicism: if a politician is
	caught lying, he will be sacrificed so that everything else
	can continue to run its course unchanged. (6)
	Didn't Hans-Georg Soeffner outline an equally cynical
	representation theory whereby we delegate the dirty business
	of politics to elected representatives so that we ourselves
	will be able to wash our hands of it? (7)
	And did not Jean-François Revel write: "The very
	first of all the forces that govern the world is the lie"? (8) However, it is not entirely true that truthfulness has
	never numbered among the political virtues and that lying
	has always been permitted as a political instrument. The
	virtue of veracity and the vice of mendacity in general,
	including the realm of politics, have often been discussed
	in the history of ideas, in the Bible, by Aristotle (9),
	by St Augustine (10),
	by St Thomas Aquinas (11)
	and by Kant (12),
	to name but some of the most important sources. Still, any
	express application to politics is somewhat rare; it is most
	likely to be found in the so-called Mirrors of Princes, for
	instance in the Mirror written by Aegidius Romanus. (13)
	Unlike the cardinal virtues of justice (iustitia),
	self-control (temperantia), strength
	(fortitudo) and good sense (prudentia),
	veracity (veracitas) is hardly ever found in the art
	of politics, either. In most recent times, two authors in
	particular have expressly treated truthfulness in politics:
	the Harvard philosopher Sissela Bok (1980) and Freiburg's
	moral theologian Eberhard Schockenhoff (2000). Then again, the first political thinker who, in the long
	history of political ethics, conceived of veracity as a
	central problem of politics, is a contemporary: our honorary
	doctor Václav Havel. In 1978, between his first
	arrest and two later spells in prison, he wrote a courageous
	book entitled Versuch, in der Wahrheit zu leben
	[An attempt to live in truth]. (14)
	In this book, Havel condemned the mendaciousness of the
	post-totalitarian communist system and chose for himself the
	way of truthfulness, irrespective of the high risks of false
	imprisonment, professional discrimination and social
	ostracism. Havel did not one-sidedly regard the powers that
	be as guilty of lying; rather, he located the diabolical
	aspect of the post-totalitarian system in the fact that it
	turned victims into accomplices: by threatening them and
	their descendants with disadvantages, it coerces the victims
	to participate in it. When Havel had become president, he
	reminded his fellow citizens of their complicity arising
	from their coming to terms with life in lying. (15)
	Consequently, he exhorted them in his address before the
	first democratic general elections to vote for candidates
	who "are used to telling the truth and do not wear a
	different shirt every week". (16) Havel was primarily thinking of life under a totalitarian
	system where - to speak with Orwell - the Ministry of Truth
	rewrote even history to make it fit the prevalent
	circumstances. Yet in asides, Havel left no doubt that he
	did not consider the reality evinced in democratic countries
	to be flawless by any manner of means. (17)
	Indeed, the lies that have been told by politicians and then
	been brought to light in the most recent times, particularly
	in big countries, are shocking. Cases in point are the
	Rainbow affair in France, the Spiegel, Barschel, Engholm and
	party donation scandals in Germany, and the Pentagon Papers,
	Watergate and Irangate in the US. I shall now proceed to describe the positions in moral
	philosophy, then develop a typology on the basis of
	practical cases, and finally outline incentives for
	truthfulness in politics.
 
 
	
	1  Positions in moral philosophyLying is not the sole deviation from truth. St Thomas
	Aquinas classed truthfulness as one of the common virtues
	and contrasted it, not only with lying, but also with
	hypocrisy and boastfulness. (18)
	This, however, is far from covering the entire field of
	untruthfulness, whose further facets include perjury, false
	promises, disinformation, dissimulation, guile, breach of
	promise, palliation, flattery, pretexts, distraction,
	suppression of important information, secrecy, obfuscation,
	forgery, deception, and manipulation by means of
	advertising. Montaigne wrote that the opposite of veracity
	was a boundless field containing a hundred thousand
	varieties. (19)
	Yet lying is the clearest and most conspicuous form of
	untruthfulness, and this is why moral philosophy has focused
	on the lie as the nucleus of untruthfulness, lying conceived
	as a false statement or a false sign made with intent to
	deceive. Three positions are to be discerned in moral philosophy:
	the absolute prohibition of lying, the basic permissibility
	of political lying, and its partial permissibility. 1.1  The absolute prohibition of
	lying
 The first author of antiquity to deal systematically with
	lying was St Augustine. (20)
	He differentiated between eight levels of lying. Yet he
	regarded any lying as sinful, even a lying that would harm
	no one or protect someone innocent. The Bible and the church
	fathers were his main sources. Christ said in the Sermon on
	the Mount: "But let your communication be, Yea, yea; Nay,
	nay: for whatsoever is more than these cometh of evil"
	(Matt. 5, 37). John calls the devil "the father of the lie"
	(John 8, 44). The Old Testament, however, gave St Augustine
	more of a headache than the New. Of course, he was able to
	refer to the Eighth Commandment (Ex. 20, 16) and to the
	numerous complaints about falsehood in the Psalms (e.g. Ps.
	5, 7). But what should be thought of the false reports in
	the Old Testament, and particularly of the "most refined
	staging of a successful feint" (21)
	when Jacob, at the instigation of his mother, Rebecca, made
	his blind father, Isaac, believe that he was the elder
	brother, Esau, thus obtaining the firstborn's inheritance by
	false pretences? (Gen. 27, 1-40) Augustine solved the
	problem presented by such biblical passages with the pious
	explanation: "Non est mendacium, sed mysterium." Immanuel Kant represented the same rigorism, not on
	theological grounds, but on the basis of the ethics of
	reason. (22)
	Benjamin Constant had attacked him on that score. (23)
	Kant replied with a small work entitled Über ein
	vermeintes Recht aus Menschenliebe zu lügen [On
	a putative right to lie for the love of mankind], (24)
	in which he quoted the standard case, brought into play by
	Constant, of the potential murderer who wants to be told
	whether his intended victim is inside the house. According
	to Kant, even the person thus addressed by the potential
	murderer is obliged to tell the truth. The obligation of
	veracity applies regardless of any consequences. Lying "is
	the waste and, as it were, destruction of his human
	dignity". (25) 1.2  The permissibility of lying
 St Augustine and Kant did not set their sights on
	political lying, but it was implied. With a view to
	political lying, Plato and Machiavelli defended the opposite
	position. In his Politeia, Plato granted the
	philosopher kings the right to lie in the interest of the
	state. They, and they alone, were allowed to tell lies in
	order to safeguard the ideal state. (26)
	If subjects tell lies, they will have to be punished for it.
	The powers that be, however, may spread the false tale that
	God had admixed the rulers with gold, the guardians with
	silver, and the providers of food with iron ore. (27)
	For the purpose of human breeding, they may also deceive
	couples by letting them believe they had met by chance
	whereas in fact they had been brought together with intent. (28) An even more general justification of political lying and
	untruthfulness was provided by Machiavelli in his
	Principe (29):
	the prince must be a "master of hypocrisy and
	dissimulation"; he does not keep promises if that is
	detrimental; since people are evil and bad, the prince is
	entitled to break his word; people are so stupid that every
	fraudster will find someone to defraud; it is neither
	possible nor necessary for the prince to have all the
	virtues - indeed, it is positively harmful to have them all
	and use them all the time: the appearance of virtues is
	sufficient. The Principe's motto is "seeming, not
	being": the inversion of Cicero's "being instead of
	seeming". (30)
	By way of a role model, Machiavelli recommended Cesare
	Borgia, one of the biggest crooks in the history of the
	world. He admired the sang froid with which Cesare
	lured his disloyal condottieri into a trap in
	Sinigaglia under the guise of friendship and killed them one
	after the other (31)
	- an atrocity which would serve Hitler as the model for the
	Röhm putsch. (32) 1.3  The partial permissibility of
	lying
 The intermediate position of the partial permissibility
	of lying is equivocal. In early modern times, it was
	particularly Hugo Grotius (33)
	and Samuel von Pufendorf (34)
	who investigated the problem and set up boundaries on either
	side. Since then, moral theologians and moral philosophers
	have found exemption rules in great numbers and have
	permitted lies: 
	if they are told in an extreme emergency,if they will result in great benefits, or prevent great damage,if they are told for reasons of humility or modesty,if their intention and purpose are good,if there is no intention to deceive,if the person to whom the lie is told has no right to be told the truth,if it is told for reasons of courtesy or in consideration of human frailty,if it will not harm anybody,etc. (35) The former Bishop of Chur and present Archbishop of
	Liechtenstein, who for a time adorned his name with the
	letters indicating a doctor's degree which he had never
	acquired, thought he would be able to exculpate himself by
	saying that it had not harmed anyone... Sissela Bok also permits exemption from the prohibition
	of lying, but those do not go as far as the list adduced
	above. Political lying, in particular, is measured against a
	very severe yardstick. Contrary to Plato and Machiavelli,
	she maintains that a government's position does not make
	telling lies any more honourable. (36)
	She scrutinises the usual excuses (37)
	and then rates them according to their justifiability. (38)
	First, it must be examined whether there is an honest
	alternative to lying. Then, the lying must be subjected to a
	public test, i.e. a fictitious discussion such as can be had
	among reasonable people. (39)
	The method is reminiscent of Immanuel Kant, John Rawls, and
	discourse ethics. Sissela Bok does not believe that these problems can be
	solved in abstract terms. By that token, she also rejects
	the utilitarian approach which determines the permissibility
	of lying on the basis of beneficial consequences alone.
	Rather, she prefers following the Stoics, Talmudists and
	early Christian thinkers and tackling the problem on the
	basis of concrete cases. (40)
	The following typology will also be based on practical
	cases.
 
 
	
	2  A typology of practical casesI shall first deal with some cases of legitimate
	untruthfulness, followed by some that strike me as
	illegitimate. In doing so, I shall admit forms of
	untruthfulness which are not lies in the defined sense of
	the word. 2.1  Legitimate untruthfulnessUntruthfulness out of courtesy or
	consideration
 The courtesies that are customary in diplomatic relations
	are harmless, just as everyday restraint for reasons of
	human consideration does not yet constitute hypocrisy. (41)
	Truth can be hurtful, indeed offensive. We need not tell
	every fool to his face that he is one. Suppression, discretion, and secrecy The case collection of Harvard University includes the
	following occurrence. (42)
	On the occasion of the Cuba crisis in 1962, the two
	superpowers were facing the abyss of direct military
	confrontation. The Soviet Union was about to establish a
	nuclear missile base in Cuba. The US demanded that the base
	should be closed down, and set up a blockade against Soviet
	freighters. At the climax of the crisis, Khrushchev made an
	offer to John F. Kennedy in a letter that the USSR would
	give up the Cuban base if, by way of countermove, the US
	withdrew the nuclear missiles stationed in Turkey. Now, the
	American President had ordered the close-down of the missile
	base in Turkey twice before; however, the order had not been
	carried out because the Turkish government opposed it.
	Kennedy did not regard it as politic to accept the Soviet
	offer since such a deal might raise doubts among the
	European allies as to whether the US nuclear umbrella over
	Western Europe had any permanence. Kennedy decided to reply
	to a previous letter of Khrushchev's and to propose that the
	US would not invade Cuba. At the same time, he unofficially
	sent his brother Robert to the Soviet UN ambassador, Anatoly
	Dobrynin, with the private message that the President had
	already ordered the withdrawal of the nuclear missiles from
	Turkey and that he gave his assurance that this order would
	be carried out speedily. Khrushchev gave in. Subsequently,
	Kennedy was asked at a press conference whether the US had
	made any concessions with regard to disarmament. The
	President's answer was negative; he said that he had
	instructed the negotiators to limit themselves exclusively
	to Cuba and that no other questions had been discussed. This reply was true, but it was incomplete. Strictly
	speaking, there had not been any bartering of base against
	base. But Kennedy suppressed that he had unofficially given
	his assurance that the missiles would now be withdrawn from
	Turkey without any delay. The President had not made a
	concession but confirmed a decision he had made earlier.
	This suppression was risky, but not contrary to the truth.
	No one, not even a politician, is obliged to tell everyone
	else the whole truth at any time. Unlike a witness in a
	criminal trial, we are not obliged "to tell the truth, the
	whole truth and nothing but the truth". We would not have
	won the popular ballot for the extension building of our
	University if we had not carefully suppressed our weak
	points. This does not mean that suppression, discretion and
	secrecy are justified in every case. Secretmongering can
	also be exaggerated, which is what Pericles criticised the
	Spartans for in his funeral oration for the Athenians who
	had fallen in the first year of the Peloponnese War. During
	the time when I served in the Swiss Army, I had the
	impression that secrecy was exaggerated. Virtually every
	order could have been classified one level lower. Aargau's senator Julius Binder made a move along these
	lines in parliament. Conversely, a joker proposed that a
	fifth level of secrecy should be introduced: "For service
	use only", "Confidential", "Secret" and "Top secret" should
	be supplemented by the new and highest level called "Destroy
	before reading"! Ambiguity and secret reservation Galilei stated in the ecclesiastical inquisition trial
	that he had never believed that Copernicus was right. When
	he was saying that, however, he was secretly thinking that
	he did not believe but knew that the earth revolves around
	the sun and not vice versa. In this way, he ensured that he
	was given a milder punishment. It is quite possible that the
	circles around Cardinal Bellarmin realised what Galilei was
	up to. His secret reservation was legitimate since the
	inquisition court was not entitled to force anyone to revoke
	the results of scientific research. Meanwhile, the Roman
	Catholic church has had to acknowledge this, too, in that it
	has rehabilitated Galilei in a highly embarrassing and
	lengthy proceeding, with a delay of nearly four hundred
	years. The secret reservation was brought into discredit,
	particularly among Protestants, under the term mental
	reservation, after Pascal, in his ninth Lettre
	provinciale had launched a polemic against "Jesuit"
	craftiness. (43) Again, this does not mean that ambiguity and secret
	reservation are legitimate in every case. I shall return to
	this later. White lie to save life and limb (44) For English Catholics, French Protestants and Spanish
	Jews, pretending to have changed their denomination or
	religion was often the only way of saving their property,
	often even life and limb, in early modern times. (45)
	This was legitimate since the state and the churches
	violated the freedom of religion with their repression. If
	self-defence against the use of violence is lawful, then so
	is a white lie to save life and limb. And if a white lie is
	lawful on one's own behalf, then it is a fortiori
	lawful for the protection of others. The Bible provides an example. When Saul wanted to kill
	his son-in-law David, David's wife Michal lied to the
	messengers in order to enable him to escape (I. Sam. 19,
	8-24). St Augustine and Kant may have thought of this when
	they fundamentally rejected any white lie, even the one in
	this specific case. In the fragment "Was heisst: Die
	Wahrheit sagen" [What does it Mean: to Speak the
	Truth], which Dieter Bonhoeffer wrote in a Gestapo
	prison, he called the exponents of this rigorism "truth
	fanatics ". (46)
	In a hierarchy of values, the protection of innocently
	prosecuted people carries more weight than the obligation of
	being truthful. Those people who, in the Second World War,
	hid Jews and, in so doing, invented a white lie or violated
	a law, deserved admiration for their brave deed, not blame
	or even punishment. Stratagems (47) In the Second World War, the Allies planned to invade the
	French Atlantic coast from England. These plans were not
	only kept secret but were combined with strategic deception.
	This deception proved successful, and the Germans believed
	that the invasion would take place at a different time, and
	not in bad weather, and in a different place, not in
	Normandy. This case is easy to judge. If military force against an
	aggressor is legitimate (jus ad bellum), then it
	would not make any sense if the milder form of deception
	should not be legitimate, either (ius in bello).
	Warring parties expect stratagems to be used. Since Hugo
	Grotius (48)
	the international law of war (49)
	has expressly declared stratagems lawful. 2.2  Illegitimate untruthfulness
 My seven cases of illegitimate untruthfulness all come
	from abroad, not one of them from Switzerland. However, this
	does not mean to say that I am inclined to see the mote in
	the other's eye but not the beam in my own. The simple
	reason is that I have not found any spectacular Swiss case.
	Apparently, exponents of bigger countries are more sorely
	tempted than the politicians of small countries. Power is
	liable to entice people into corruption, great power into a
	high degree of corruption. Life in a small country may well
	be governed by what George Bernard Shaw mockingly wrote:
	"Virtue is insufficient temptation!" Qualified mental reservation The Harvard case collection describes the undercover
	operation conducted by the US secret service, the CIA,
	against the election of Salvador Allende in 1970. (50)
	After no candidate had won an absolute majority, it was up
	to the Chilean congress to choose from among the two leading
	contenders. Although the CIA had spent eight million dollars
	to prevent it, Allende was elected. The secret operation had
	an aftermath in the American Senate when President Nixon
	nominated the previous CIA chief, Richard Helms, to be the
	US ambassador to Iran. During the hearings in the Senate,
	the following dialogue took place: Senator Symington asked
	Helms whether the CIA had tried to topple the Chilean
	government. Helms replied: "No, sir." Senator Symington then
	asked whether any monies had been given to opponents of
	Allende's. Again the reply was: "No, sir." According to the letter Helms's answers were correct. The
	point at issue was not to topple the government but to
	prevent the President's election. And no monies were given
	to individuals but to groups which supported or rejected
	candidates. This case of mental reservation cannot be
	justified, for there is no excuse for deceiving a
	democratically elected parliamentary organ, which is
	entitled to clarify issues in a democracy, with a cheap
	trick. Helms's behaviour undermined democracy and, in the
	long term, contributed to a loss of confidence in the
	American administration. Thus not every mental reservation is legitimate. The US
	Congress considered the question. When the members of the
	House of Representatives are sworn in, they must swear to
	take and comply with the oath upon the constitution without
	any mental reservation: ""Do you solemnly swear that you
	will support and defend the Constitution of the United
	States against all enemies, foreign and domestic; that you
	will bear true faith and allegiance to the same; that you
	take this obligation freely, without any mental
	reservation or purpose of evasion; and that you will
	well and faithfully discharge the duties of the office on
	which you are about to enter. So help you God?" Unlawful word of honour The case of illegal, i.e. undeclared party donations to
	Germany's chancellor Helmut Kohl is still widely talked
	about. After the former chancellor first denied the
	acceptance of such donations and then only admitted as much
	as had been proved already, he refused to disclose the names
	of the donors by invoking his word of honour. The chancellor's behaviour was in glaring contravention
	of the constitution, the party donation law, and the
	official oath. A politician's word of honour "only deserves
	the general public's respect as long as the action to which
	he pledges his honour remains within the framework of the
	law and on the ground of honesty. A word of honour which
	refers to the maintenance of secrecy about jointly
	perpetrated violations of the law does not meet this
	requirement. In a case of conflict, it must therefore give
	way to the readiness to enforce the law, as is in accordance
	with the official oath sworn by high-ranking politicians
	before the general public." (51) Electioneering fraud Sissela Bok's book refers to the case of the American
	presidential campaign of 1964. (52)
	The point at issue was the re-election of President Johnson
	as against Senator Goldwater. In the campaign, the Vietnam
	War played an important part. The situation in Vietnam was
	constantly worsening. In the Johnson Administration, the
	view had gained ground that an increase in the US commitment
	could not be avoided. Making a big song and dance about
	this, however, was not politic in the campaign. Senator
	Goldwater championed an escalation of the war and did not
	shy from nuclear threats, either. Conversely, Johnson was
	depicted as a harbinger of peace. He himself proclaimed that
	the overriding problem, the crucial point in the election
	campaign was the question as to who would best be able to
	preserve peace. The electioneering strategy proved
	successful. Johnson was elected. A short time after the
	election, he ordered a reinforcement of troops in South
	Vietnam and the bombardment of North Vietnam. In order to be
	elected, Johnson duped the American electorate in a
	reproachable manner. Disinformation of parliament and the
	people The 1964 electioneering fraud was systematic. It was no
	isolated incident but part of a deception that went on for
	years: a deception not of the enemy but of the country's own
	population. There is evidence of this in the Pentagon
	Papers. Hannah Arendt wrote a great essay about them. (53)
	Still under Johnson's presidency, the US defence minister
	Robert S. McNamara had commissioned a secret study to
	provide a systematic picture of the history of the Vietnam
	War. This study clearly revealed that for years, the
	government had deceived the American public with purposively
	optimistic information about how the war was progressing.
	The deception of Congress in the Tonkin affair was
	particularly grave. In August 1964, a US destroyer was shot
	at by North Vietnamese torpedo boats in the Gulf of Tonkin.
	The American government reacted to the alleged surprise
	attack with indignation. The Pentagon Papers made it
	clear that the incident was a concerted American
	provocation. Its purpose was to get the US Congress to grant
	the President the power of attorney for a stronger
	commitment in this undeclared war. This then happened.
	Someone involved with this secret study, Daniel Ellsberg,
	informed the New York Times, which started to print
	selected articles from the Pentagon Papers. In the
	meantime, Johnson had been replaced by President Nixon, who
	tried to stop publication by means of a court order.
	However, the Supreme Court ruled in favour of the freedom of
	the press and deemed that the Pentagon Papers were
	not worth classifying. Subsequently, they were published in
	their entirety. The 47 volumes of the Pentagon Papers prove that
	the American government had for years provided its own
	people with an overoptimistic picture of the war. The
	Vietnam War, which had never been declared and which ended
	with a disastrous defeat of the USA, was accompanied by a large-scale disinformation
	campaign aimed at saving the US population's fragile
	acceptance of the commitment. This short-term, dishonest
	image policy resulted in a credibility gap with long-term
	effects. Rigged elections The invocation of the name "Milosevic" will suffice! Broken promise It makes an essential difference whether the person
	making the promise at the time believed in good faith that
	he would be able to fulfill it and circumstances then
	changed fundamentally in an unforeseeable manner, or whether
	he secretly harboured the intention to break the promise
	even at the time when he made it. The latter was the case
	when the Hungarian uprising was crushed in 1956. The Soviet
	government guaranteed the Hungarian Prime Minister Imre Nagy
	and his Defence Minister Pál Maleter safe conduct to
	the negotiations, and then killed them immediately. Politician's official lie The 1972-1974 Watergate affair is a case in point. In May
	1972, the Democrats' headquarters in the Watergate Building
	were broken into in order to tap the telephone of President
	Nixon's Democratic rival. In June 1972, a second burglary
	was attempted, this time to tap the phone of the chairman of
	the Democratic Party. However, the burglars were caught,
	arrested and tried. On the strength of an investigation
	conducted by the Ministry of Justice, and of research
	carried out by two journalists on the Washington
	Post, it came to light that the break-ins had been
	executed with the approval of Nixon's campaign chief, and
	that they were merely the tip of an iceberg of numerous
	dirty tricks, such as defamatory machinations against rivals
	of Nixon's. The two journalists were later awarded the
	Pulitzer Prize. President Nixon tried to wriggle out of it
	by solemnly protesting that he knew nothing about it. He
	repeated this statement several times, both before and after
	his splendid re-election. After his re-election, the Senate
	set up an investigation committee. When it became known that
	all the conversations in the Oval Office of the White House
	had been tape-recorded, the Justice Ministry's and the
	Senate Committee's special investigator demanded that the
	tapes be surrendered. Nixon refused this request with
	reference to his executive privilege. However, the Supreme
	Court ordered the disclosure of the tapes, which revealed
	that Nixon had been informed three days after the second
	burglary at the latest, and that he had therefore lied to
	the American public several times. In July 1974, the House
	of Representatives initiated the impeachment proceeding
	against the President. Nixon escaped his impeachment by
	resigning from office. Perjury before a parliamentary investigation
	committee This leads us to the Iran/Contra affair of 1984-1986. It
	is documented in the case collection of Harvard University. (54)
	The affair was an undercover action since it was known to
	only a few people in the National Security Council and in
	the CIA. President Reagan was partially informed, the
	Secretary of State and the Defence Minister were as good as
	not informed at all, and nor were Congress and the
	committees responsible for secret operations. The double
	affair consisted, first, in the secret sale of weapons to
	Iran for the liberation of American hostages in Lebanon and,
	second, in the use of the proceeds of the arms sales for the
	support of the Contra rebels against the Sandinista regime
	in Nicaragua. When the deal came to light, Congress
	conducted an investigation that lasted several months.
	During the interrogation, the two main protagonists, Admiral
	John Poindexter and Lieutenant Colonel Oliver North, lied to
	the Congress committees and sabotaged the investigation by
	destroying and forging documents. Even so, Congress managed
	to expose the affair. North was cashiered, and Poindexter
	had to resign from this office as the President's security
	adviser. The main protagonists tried to exonerate themselves by
	saying that the arms export had not been carried out
	directly but through third parties, that no budgetary funds
	released by Congress had been used, and the President had
	basically given his consent, and that lies and cover-ups had
	been necessary because the "enemy" was listening in. Both
	covert operations were illegal since there was a ban on arms
	exports to Iran and because Congress had prohibited any
	support of the Contra rebels. Lying to parliament, and even
	more so committing perjury before a parliamentary
	investigation committee, cannot be justified in a democracy
	by any manner of means. These horror stories involving different types and cases
	of whopping lies and other untruthfulness might create the
	impression that politics is a thoroughly dirty business even
	in constitutional democracies. This conclusion would,
	however, be premature. Although we are unaware of the
	percentage of undetected cases, we do not know when and how
	often politicians have been prevented from untruthful words
	and deeds by their personal integrity or for fear of the
	consequences of being found out.
 
 
	
	3  Incentives for truthfulnessAre there any incentives for truthfulness in politics? Or
	more precisely: are there any incentives in person-oriented,
	institution-oriented or results-oriented ethics? (55)
	 
	
	Person-oriented political ethics strive towards an
	approximation to morally good politics through good office
	holders,
	
	institution-oriented ethics do so through good
	institutions, and 
	
	results-oriented ethics through good
	results.
	 3.1  Person-oriented political
	ethics
 In November 1997, the General Secretary of the United
	Nations was presented with a draft Universal Declaration
	of Human Responsibilities. (56)
	The draft was conceived of as a counterpart to the
	Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which had been
	announced by the United Nations in 1948. Fifty years on, the
	declaration of rights was complemented by a declaration of
	responsibilities. Art. 12 of the Universal Declaration of Human
	Responsibilities says: "Every person has a
	responsibility to speak and act truthfully. No one,
	however high or mighty, should speak lies. The right to
	privacy and to personal and professional confidentiality is
	to be respected. No one is obliged to tell all the truth to
	everyone all the time." At first sight, this may sound naive. But on closer
	inspection, one is amazed to find that the author of the
	Universal Declaration of Human Responsibilities is
	none other than the InterAction Council, an association of
	former heads of state and heads of government from all five
	continents. Its Honorary Chairman is Helmut Schmidt, former
	Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany, and its
	present Chairman is Malcolm Fraser, former Prime Minister of
	Australia. Twenty-five of the elder statesmen signed the
	draft declaration, among them Switzerland's former Federal
	Councillor Kurt Furgler. The draft of the Universal Declaration of Human
	Responsibilities was not simply dashed off. Rather, it
	was prepared in two expert meetings and two annual general
	meetings of the InterAction Council. The main author was the
	Swiss theologian Hans Küng, who had initiated a
	worldwide movement with his book Global Responsibility,
	In Search of a New World Ethic in 1990. The aim of the
	movement is the establishment of a modicum of shared ethical
	values, fundamental attitudes and standards which can be
	agreed upon by, if at all possible, all the religions,
	regions and nations. In 1993, the Parliament of the World's
	Religions issued a declaration regarding a global ethic. (57)
	This declaration, as well as Hans Küng's book A
	Global Ethic for Global Politics and Economics,
	published in 1997, emphasise the obligation of truthfulness. (58) The publication of the Universal Declaration of Human
	Responsibilities triggered off a partially fierce debate
	in the German weekly newspaper Die Zeit. (59)
	This is not the place to go into the ins and outs of that
	debate, but a further-reaching result of the controversy has
	an immediate connection with the obligation of truthfulness.
	In his opening article, Helmut Schmidt had laid a false
	track. (60)
	Like the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of
	1948, the Declaration of Human Responsibilities is
	not legally binding; they are both declarations of intent.
	Yet the Declaration of Human Rights resulted in treaties
	that are binding under international law, particularly the
	two UN Human Rights Conventions of 1966. Now Helmut Schmidt
	hoped that the Declaration of Human Responsibilities
	would have a legal impact in a comparable manner. That was a
	wrong track. Why? There are legal responsibilities, and there are ethical
	responsibilities. The distinction here used to be between
	perfect and imperfect responsibilities. (61)
	Tax liability, conscription, electoral duty, the prohibition
	of torture, the prohibition of theft, the protection of the
	civilian population in times of war, etc., can be
	established as legal responsibilities. But the
	"responsibility to treat all people in a humane way" (Art.
	1) or the golden rule "What you do not wish to be done to
	yourself, do not do to others" (Art. 4) are inappropriate
	for a legally binding form. The same applies to the
	obligation of truthfulness of Article 12. If we recognise that the obligation of truthfulness is
	not meant as a legal responsibility but as a moral appeal,
	then it has the potential to sharpen office holders'
	consciences. It does not only merit inclusion in a
	Universal Declaration of Human Responsibilities, but
	also in professional codes of conduct for politicians or in
	newly formulated political oaths, which office holders have
	to swear in most countries. Understood in this way, Article
	12 of the Universal Declaration of Human
	Responsibilities is not naive. And generally speaking,
	the wish appears to be justified that the Declaration of
	Human Responsibilities should be debated by the United
	Nations and that it should be adopted as a declaration of
	intent, possibly in an amended form. 3.2  Institution-oriented political
	ethics
 Moral appeals on their own are effective only up to a
	point. Claus Offe wrote: "Politics are only as honest as
	their institutions are effective..." (62)
	The qualifier "only" strikes me as exaggerated. However,
	institutions are very important as incentives for
	truthfulness. In a democracy, such institutions are the
	opposition, parliament, the judiciary, and the media. If
	they work well, they will discourage lies, deception and
	other kinds of untruthfulness. In four of the cases discussed above, the democratic
	institutions functioned, albeit with losses, and only after
	the event. In the German party donation scandal, the media,
	parliament and the parties worked together. In the affair of
	the Pentagon Papers, it was a combination of an
	individual citizen's personal courage, the media, and the
	Supreme Court. In the Watergate and Irangate cases, the
	checks worked thanks to the interaction between the media,
	the Justice Ministry, and Congress. Such cases may well act
	as signals. Any future politician will have to think about
	whether the risk of untruthfulness is worth it. He is well
	aware now that public response will be very severe. Those
	who are caught will have to expect a hiatus in their career,
	or its very end. 3.3  Results-oriented political
	ethics
 Political trust and mistrust are the result of, among
	other things, truthful or untruthful behaviour. Truthfulness
	fosters trust, untruthfulness destroys it. Trust is a
	fundamental category in a democracy, in a constitutional
	state and in international law. The principle of trust is
	the foundation of all law. Politicians want to be elected or
	re-elected, i.e. they must make an effort to win the
	electorate's trust. Political parties want to secure as big
	a share as possible in parliamentary and government power,
	i.e. they must also make an effort to win the electorate's
	trust. It is not only the politicians and the political
	parties, however, that depend on the trust of the electorate
	and, in a direct democracy, of the voters; rather, trust and
	mistrust are also directed at institutions, at parliament,
	government, the judiciary, the constitutional state,
	democracy itself. In a democracy, any policy can only be
	implemented in the long term if it is accepted by the
	electorate, i.e. it again depends on trust. Elections and
	referendums are a trial of trust. In parliamentary
	democracies, votes of confidence or of no confidence may
	take place between election times. Opinion polls determine
	the measure of trust placed in persons, parties and
	institutions. An official ethical code enjoins US senators
	and representatives to behave so as not to bring Congress
	into disrepute. (63)
	Most recently, "truth commissions have been set up, for
	instance in South Africa, to create a new basis of trust
	through reconciliation after bloody conflicts. Of course, truthfulness and untruthfulness are not the
	only criteria of trust and mistrust. Other criteria include
	political successes and failures, or lawful and unlawful
	behaviour. However, the results of polls and media reports
	reveal very clearly that the politically interested general
	public responds very sensitively, angrily, indeed
	indignantly to untruthfulness. During the Vietnam War and in
	the wake of Watergate, the American's trust in their own
	government shrank drastically: from three quarters in 1964
	to a quarter in 1980. (64)
	Similar collapses of confidence could be observed as a
	consequence of the scandal surrounding the donations to the
	German Christian Democratic Union party and the nuclear
	submarine disaster in Russia. Politicians', political
	parties' and institutions' interest in preserving and
	enhancing trust is a positive incentive for
	truthfulness. 
	
	
 Conclusion In the introduction, I quoted Václav Havel. To
	conclude, I would like to return to him. 2500 years of
	political ethics came and went until a statesman, namely
	Havel, raised truthfulness to the rank of a decisive quality
	of politics. Max Weber, in his famous lecture Politik als
	Beruf [Politics as a Profession], demanded three
	prime characteristics from politicians: 
	passion for the cause,a sense of responsibility,and Augenmass. (65)
	[quick perception and sense of judgement] Should not a fourth characteristic be added: 
 
	
	BibliographyClassic texts that have been published in various
	editions are usually quoted in such a manner that the
	passages in question can be found in any edition. Aristotle, Nicomachian Ethics
	
	Aegidius Romanus (Colonna) (1968), De regimine
	principum libri III, unchanged reprint, Rome 1556,
	Frankfurt Arendt, Hannah (1972), Wahrheit und Lüge in
	der Politik, Munich Augustinus, Aurelius (1900), "De mendacio" and "Ad
	Consentium contra mendacium", Corpus scriptorum
	ecclesiasticorum latinorum, Vol. XXXXI (sect. V pars
	III), Prague, pp. 411-466/467-528 Bok, Sissela (1980), Lügen, Vom täglichen
	Zwang zur Unaufrichtigkeit, Reinbek bei Hamburg;
	orig. Lying: Moral Choice in Public and Private
	Life, Pantheon Books, New York, 1978 Bonhoeffer, Dietrich (1963), Ethik, 6th ed.,
	Munich Burckhardt, Jacob (1921), Weltgeschichtliche
	Betrachtungen, Stuttgart Cicero, Marcus Tullius (1984), De officiis /
	Vom pflichtgemässen Handeln, Latin/German,
	Stuttgart Geismann, Georgi/Oberer, Hariolf, eds. (1986), Kant
	und das Recht der Lüge, Würzburg Grotius, Hugo (1950), De iure belli ac pacis libri
	tres, Drei Bücher vom Recht des Krieges und des
	Friedens, Paris 1625, new German text and preface by
	Walter Schätzel, Tübingen Gutmann, Amy/Thompson, Dennis, eds. (1990), Ethics
	and Politics, Cases and Comments, 2nd ed.,
	Chicago Häberle, Peter (1995), Wahrheitsprobleme im
	Verfassungsstaat, Baden-Baden Havel, Václav (1989), Versuch, in der
	Wahrheit zu leben, Reinbek bei Hamburg Havel, Václav (1991), Angst vor der
	Freiheit, Reden des Staatspräsidenten, Reinbek
	bei Hamburg Kant, Immanuel (1963), Werke in sechs
	Bänden, Darmstadt Kemper, Peter, ed. (1993), Opfer der Macht,
	Müssen Politiker ehrlich sein?, Frankfurt
	a.M. Küng, Hans (1978), Wahrhaftigkeit, Zur Zukunft
	der Kirche, Freiburg i.Br. Küng, Hans (1990), Projekt Weltethos,
	Munich; tr. Global Responsibility, In Search of a New
	World Ethic, SCM Press, London 1991 Küng, Hans/Kuschel, Karl-Josef, eds. (1993),
	Erklärung zum Weltethos, Die Deklaration des
	Parlaments der Weltreligionen, München Küng, Hans (1997), Weltethos für
	Weltpolitik und Weltwirtschaft, München; tr.
	Global Ethic for Global Politics and Economics Laros, Matthias (1951), Seid klug wie die Schlangen
	und einfältig wie die Tauben, Frankfurt a.M. Machiavelli, Niccolò, Il Principe Machiavelli, Niccolò (1990), Politische
	Schriften, Herfried Münkier (ed.), Frankfurt
	a.M. Martel, Andrea (2001), Vom guten Parlamentarier,
	Eine Studie der Ethikregeln im US-Kongress, Berne Montaigne, Michel de (1985), Essais, Zurich Müller, Gregor (1962), Die
	Wahrhaftigkeitspflicht und die Problematik der
	Lüge, Freiburg i.Br. Münkier, Herfried (2000), "Das Ethos der
	Demokratie. Über Ehre, Ehrlichkeit, Lügen und
	Karrieren in der Politik", Politische
	Vierteljahresschrift, 41st year, June 2000, No. 2,
	pp. 302-315 Orren, Gary (1997), "Fall from Grace: The Public's
	Loss of Faith in Government", Joseph S. Nye Jr./Philip 0.
	Zelikow/David C. King (eds.), Why People don't Trust
	Government, Cambridge, Mass. Pascal, Blaise (1998), Oeuvres
	complètes, Vol. 1, Paris Plato, Politeia Pufendorf, Samuel von (1994), Über die Pflicht
	des Menschen und des Bürgers nach dem Gesetz der
	Natur, Frankfurt a.M. and Leipzig Revel, Jean-François (1990), Die Herrschaft
	der Lüge, Wie Medien und Politiker die
	Öffentlichkeit manipulieren,
	Vienna/Darmstadt Riklin, Alois (1995), "Politische Ethik", Helmut
	Kramer (eds.), Politische Theorie und
	Ideengeschichte, Vienna, pp. 81-104 Schmidt, Helmut, ed. (1997), Allgemeine
	Erklärung der Menschenpflichten, München;
	The English text on 
	interactioncouncil.org
	> Human Responsibility
	> .../publications/universal-declaration-human-responsibilities Schockenhoff, Eberhard (2000), Zur Lüge
	verdammt - Politik, Medien, Medizin, Justiz, Wissenschaft
	und die Ethik der Wahrheit, Freiburg i.Br. Soeffner, Hans-Georg (1998), "Erzwungene
	Ästhetik. Repräsentation, Zeremonien und Ritual
	in der Politik", Herbert Willems/Martin Jurga (eds.),
	Inszenierungsgesellschaft. Ein einführendes
	Handbuch, Opladen, pp. 215-234 Sternberger, Doif (1988), "Wiessee und Sinigaglia, Zu
	Hitlers Mordaktion vom 30. Juni 1934", in: Breitling,
	Rupertt/Gellner, Winand (eds.), Politische Studien zu
	Machiavellismus und demokratische Legitimierung, Teil
	I der Politischen Studien zum 65. Geburtstag von Erwin
	Faul, Gerlingen Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica Weber, Max (1964), Politik als Beruf,
	Berlin Zagorin, Perez (1990), Ways of Lying.
	Dissimulation, Persecution, and Conformity in Early
	Modern Europe, Cambridge Mass.
 
 
	(1) Burckhardt
	1921, pp. 33/96/140 
	back ^ (2) Machiavelli
	1967, 1126, p.88 
	back ^ (3) Arendt 1972, pp.
	8/44 
	back ^ (4) Luhmann, in:
	Kemper 1993, p.40 
	back ^ (5) Ibid., p.34
	
	back ^ (6) Ibid., p.39
	
	back ^ (7) Soeffner 1998,
	p.224 (quoted after Münkler 2000, p.303)
	
	back ^ (8) Revel 1990, p.
	11 
	back ^ (9) Nicomachian
	Ethics, 1127 a 20-1128 b 9 
	back ^ (10) De
	mendacio and Contra mendacium 
	back ^ (11) Summa
	theologica, II-II q. 109-112 
	back ^ (12) Über
	ein vermeintes Recht aus Menschenliebe zu lügen
	(Kant, Vol. 4, pp. 637-643) 
	back ^ (13) De regimine
	principum, pp. 80-82 
	back ^ (14) Havel 1989
	
	back ^ (15) Havel 1991,
	pp. 8-17 
	back ^ (16) Ibid., p.83
	
	back ^ (17) Havel 1989,
	pp. 84-86 
	back ^ (18) St Thomas
	Aquinas, II-II q. 109-112 
	back ^ (19) Montaigne
	1985, pp. 79-83 ("Von den Lügnern" [Of the
	liars]) 
	back ^ (20) Augustinus
	1968, pp. 411-466/467-528; Müller 1962, pp. 52-56
	
	back ^ (21) Schockenhoff
	2000, p.59 
	back ^ (22)
	Geismann/Oberer 1986 
	back ^ (23) Ibid., pp.
	23-25 
	back ^ (24) Kant 1963,
	Vol. 4, pp. 637-643 
	back ^ (25) Ibid., p.562
	("Metaphysik der Sitten" [The Metaphysics of
	Morals]) 
	back ^ (26) Plato, 389 b-d
	
	back ^ (27) Ibid.,
	414c-415b 
	back ^ (28) Ibid., 459c-e
	
	back ^ (29) Machiavelli,
	Il Principe, Chap. XVIII 
	back ^ (30) Cicero, De
	officiis, II/44, p. 181 
	back ^ (31) Machiavelli
	1990, pp. 375-379 
	back ^ (32) Sternberger
	1988, p.85 
	back ^ (33) Grotius 1950,
	111/1 
	back ^ (34) Pufendorf
	1994, 1/10 
	back ^ (35) Müller
	1962, pp. 271-279/325-327/330-334 
	back ^ (36) Bok 198O, p.
	219 
	back ^ (37) Ibid., pp.
	98-116 
	back ^ (38) Ibid., pp.
	117-135 
	back ^ (39) Ibid., pp.
	119-132 
	back ^ (40) Ibid., pp.
	76/78 
	back ^ (41) Ibid., p.213;
	Schockenhoff 2000, p.37 
	back ^ (42)
	Gutmann/Thompson 1990, pp. 39-74 
	back ^ (43) Pascal 1998,
	p. 679 
	back ^ (44) Laros 1951, p.
	37; Bok 1980, pp. 65/136; Schockenhoff 2000, pp. 106-108
	
	back ^ (45) Zagorin 1990;
	Schockenhoff 2000, p. 89 
	back ^ (46) Bonhoeffer
	1963, p. 388 
	back ^ (47) Ibid., p.391;
	Bok 1980, p. 178 
	back ^ (48) Grotius 1950,
	III/1, VI 
	back ^ (49) The Hague Law
	of Land Warfare, Art. 24 
	back ^ (50)
	Gutmann/Thompson 1990, p. 44 
	back ^ (51) Schockenhoff
	2000, p.324 
	back ^ (52) Bok 1980, pp.
	207-209 
	back ^ (53) Arendt 1972,
	pp. 7-43 
	back ^ (54)
	Gutmann/Thompson 1990, pp. 48-60 
	back ^ (55) For an
	explanation of this differentiation, cf. Riklin 1995
	
	back ^ (56)
	Text on:
	interactioncouncil.org
	> Human Responsibility
	> .../publications/universal-declaration-human-responsibilities
	back ^
	 (57) Towards a Global Ethic: an Initial Declaration, 
	> google.ch/search?q=Towards a Global Ethic: An Initial Declaration cpwr.org
	[no more] on
	cpwr.org/resource/global_ethic.htm (cpwr.org/calldocs/EthicTOC.html) [as in the printed edition]
	
	back ^ (58) Küng
	1997, pp. 108-112 
	back ^ (59) Die
	Zeit, No. 41 of 3/10/1997, No. 42 of 10/10/1997, No.
	43 of 17/10/1997, No. 44 of 24/10/1997, No. 45 of
	31/10/1997 
	back ^ (60) Die
	Zeit, No. 41 of 3/10/1997 
	back ^ (61) Küng in:
	Schmidt 1997, p.92 
	back ^ (62) Offe in:
	Kemper 1993, p.131 
	back ^ (63) Martel 2001,
	p. 71 
	back ^ (64) Orren 1997,
	pp. 80f 
	back ^ (65) A term that
	does not readily translate into English. Literally
	"measurement by eye", it means precisely that for a
	craftsman who, with a quick and experienced eye, is
	capable of measuring dimensions without the application
	of a measuring tape. At an abstract level, the term
	accordingly denotes a quick faculty of perception
	combined with a sound sense of judgement.
	
	back ^
 
     |